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D?S T'.,is is the first inter,:i,~~-, with Y:r. 3utler 0:1. 7hursday, the 19th of 
Ju..n.e, 1975, at 2: 00 in the afte:-noon. ',ie a:-e r:or. tr-Jir:g t c do an 
o\rerall histor-J of the irr:peach:.1'=nt. I zeroed in on the backgrou.'1d and 
results of the Coalition. 
MCB - All right. On the basis of that I how could ·11e have possibly anything else 
to talk about [in view of the ~!ooney and Woodlief tapes]? 
DFS - We have much more from you th,m from anyone else. I think you obviously 
at the ti~e made more tapes and notes and so torth than anyone else. 
We know that yonr memorJ is probably going to be better on items that 
,-;e:::-e not in those tapes. 
~'.C.5 - ;:0·..: y cn.1-i,;ill be able to m;} a s~-'= t.ne validity of rrrJ reeollections against 
thos~ ta?es, right? Sc if I tell you a different stor.r no,1,_ tbat will 
b:~ interesting, won't it? .,.. · 
DFS - For example, on the 20th of June,la;,.yes1r ·t9morrow, you said to Wood.lief 
that already you along with Walter Flowers and Mann had a power to 
deter~~ne the fate of the P~esident of the United States; that was on 
the 20th of June. Now what I would like to note simmply as an intro-
duction is that this is I totally confidential, until you edit or 
release whatever we say. And secondly, our purpose in giving you these 
queestions is simply to kind of jog your memory and so that we have ' il 
MCE 
kind of common basis for all members. · 
I feel like I've eeen jogged out, by what you've already got [the other 
tapes of Mooney and Woodlief]. I have answered everJone of these 
questions already. 
DFS - I thin.1.{ that much of that is true. 
~!CB - Why don't we must go around where you wish? 
DFS - How about if I start with what we call question #1? There are a 
counle of things that I don't thin.~ were in the tapes. 
MCB - All right. 
DFS - Emv did you express your very initial predilections about either 
impeachment of the President's guilt or innocnece? TAking for example 
your react ion on the 31st of July, 1973, when Drinan introduced his 
first resolution to impeach? How did you read that? 
MCB - & considered the source • . _cI want you to understand that I'm not • 
. , pre,j:.idiced against all brothers of the cloth, but I thin!< he is a -
? L\ ~ 'f- little bit of a scre·.-1ball and that was ITT'J reaction to it. You realize, 
. cf course, that the basis of his first impeachment resolution was 
Cambodia. My i~ur,iediate reaction W-3.S entirely negative, almcst ridicule, 
and ultimately that was the position of t:i.e Committee; we j-g.st plain 
didn't impaach for Cambodia 
,. , 
, - , 
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· DFS - Which leads us directly to nur.b-~r 2. If that was your reaction to 
Vrinan, w~at in the subsequent nine months was :no3t responsible for 
making you say, "~~o~, w:1it a minute I is there something here?" 
t~CB - Oh, I started taking it seriously when it became apparant that the 
leadership was taking it seriously. When they started, I started taking 
the position of the official line, which was also my thinking, when the 
ad:ninistrati~n starts hiring staff and then we suddenly realiz.e that 
they were gearing up to this thing, we ought to hake it seriously. Now 
I cannot rerr.ember when that was. 
DFS - So it wa.s not simply what was done at, for example, the Saturday Night 
Massacre, but the reaction of the 1:Tnite House to that that caused your 
J- • • L • 0 anvl.ClpaulO;l:. That was 0c~ober 20th •••• 
~1CB - I thiriJc I took it seriosly before that. I s,till think- that I was prejudicec 
in favor of the President at that point. But I hadn't taken ariy public 
line on it I and t.hat is the smartest thing I ever did. 
DFS One of the other seven Members phrased it this way; what is your 
reaction to this: "The hearings to date · [April 4, 1974] remind me 
of the advice of Abraham Linclon when he said if you want to stop a 
church from being built, don't attack their religion, but start an 
argument over where the best location would be. It appears to me the 
stategy of the White House is to start an argument about procedural 
methods used by the Co~mittee, in an effort to divide the Co~mittee and 
make it appear that it is being unfair procedurally." Or another 
statement that "Ford brotJght his life to the Judiciary Cornmittee, 
whereas Nixon brought his lawyers." Now how does that strike you? 
MCB - He was "lawyerly" unnecessarily I thought, and you have a negative 
reaction to that. The procedural questions that they were .. raising all 
the time did offend me; I guess that I was disappointed the way the 
Republicans reacted to all that. I had a feeling that they would pick 
up a line over there in the White House, and pretty soon we were using 
it. That kind of discouraged me. 
DFS - You mentioned to Wood.lief, for example, that, "The hatehet men, Buchanan 
a::id Burch, were doing the Presid:-:et no good •••• " 
MCB - Yes, I'll stick to that; yes, sir. 
SL - Did yam- thinking chaP~e a great deal when Butterfield told the world 
on July 16th about the tapes? -the conversation in the ~mite House, 
the E0B, and the tapes? 
I~CB · - Tr.a-t was a surprise to me. No, I don't think the existence of the tapes 
changed rrrJ view of it but I do remerr:ber feeling kind of defensi'l:[e about 
the Presidnet' s right to tape. And also my i:-r.rnediate reaction was that 
he had a right to keep it. 
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1-::::B - I still feel that way too. I think that if the case had been pre3ented 
properly, and they had brought it along fro:-n the Supreme Court in a less 
defined fashion, he might have even p:!'evailed on that point, but I did 
feel that his handling of it worked against him, and the tapes presented 
evidence that ultimately did him in. 
SI.. - At the time of Ag;1ew' s p:!'oblem, now we' re up to October again, were you 
aware that he was trying perhaps to put his case before the House 
Judiciary Committee? 
MCB - Yes, I was aware that he wanted it, and I was even willing to do it if 
somebody had pushed us to it. But he coll~psed before he could get 
the strategy going. When hey had a spokesman over there to tell us 
SL 
he would sta~' in ther-e acn fight, he was on his "ilay down to plead guilty. 
Did you think that was Agnew's strategy or 
part of the general ;fnite Hou3e strategy? 
up the Judiciary Committee? 
did you think perhaps it was 
That possibly could have tied 
MCB - I was never aware of any such strategy as that. No. I just never 
heard of it. 
DFS - I'm going on to the concept of an impeachable offence. That's number 
3. You particularly stressed the "reasonable expectations of the 
American people." 
MCB - Yes, I did that in a statement. 
DFS - Let's take this: here we have what is objectively a serious offence, 
either criminal or political, but neither has so aroused the American 
people that they are aware of the seriousness of the threat to the 
Ametican political and constitutional system. Is the President impeachable 
MCB - Yes, I see your_ point. Yes, my view of that is that we do- simply what 
I feel our job is: to place the charge and the Senate by its guilty vote 
determines whether it's enough to require removal of the Presidnet. So 
I've always felt, I guess, I'd like to go back and study my own evolution 
--I started off with a pretty narrow view, but the more I thoght about it, 
the broader I got my feeling about it. Simply because so much of the 
President's actions and attitudes ca~~,ot be spelled out in criminal law. 
And to answer your question more specifically about this. If there is a 
heinous offense of which we the corrmittee are totally aware of, for 
example, he had in his negotiations with a foreign power give away 
secrets, just spilled the beans ~--ihile he was drunk and for security 
reasons we kept that a secret. I think it would be our obligation to 
impeach him or recomT.end an impeachment. This is the obJigation of the 
Senate and the House to make efforts to congrol the information, even 
in the absence of the knowledge and support of the American people. 
DFS - i'~ow you said in your public state!nent that Thursday night that the 
people are entitled to sssume that the Presidnet in telling the truth. 
New is lying itself by a Presiden:h impeachable or the subject-matter 
of the lying? 
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!·'.GB - :,fell, t he ni ce thing about a ll t, hese is you don' t have to say exactly, but 
a co:1.sist e:it rni sr~:,:rese?:ta.ti'.)n i s anotter ..:atter. That's exedly right. 
I felt w2 '.•;er:;; r:.' t i r::peaching hi m f or lying but it sure does color his 
cred.5.. :;ility. 
DFS - Again you r.ient ioned i n your tapesJ the Fresiddntial responsibility for. 
truthfulness of suoordinates after the fact. Once he became aware of, _ 
for example, Kleindiest's statements, does that constitute, by indirection, 
an i ':npeachable offence? 
MCB - Oh, absolutely. I think that is sorr.ewhere along the line of ostruction 
of justice. Knowlingly misrepre senting the q'.1alifications of a man you 
pcL11.ted out as trustworthy is a breach of f aith, whether it's elevat ed 
to the st~tus of an impachable off ense is a matter of j~dgment. That 
wa-s rv· vic'..i a nd t hat i::; st ill my vie~·, . I've :i:et Kliendiest seve:::-al 
times-I go to church ther2, a l i t t le :::piscopal ch:ircht and he_' s 0:1 
th8 vestry. I!e is a neighbor and he has been very cordial to rr.e; I 
feel a little bit self-conscious about it. 'I think he acted very, very 
good -running that guy off his gold course. That's what kind of upset 
me a little bit; even at the time I 'felt like that~s a guy that has 
some integrity. Of course, he might have been slightly stupid. * 
DFS - On the 18th of last July, St. Clair insisted that the proof be clear 
and convincing. What standard of proof did you require? 
I C 
I 
MCB - When you talk about a standard of proof, you' re talking about what the 
facts r.ave established at the indictme!'lt or accusatory .level. I think 
looking back over it, when they say_clear and convincing, they are talking 
about, assuming that we believe the facts, clear and convincing evidence 
that he . ought .. to .be removed, not clear and convincing evidence that the 
facts have been e~tablished. And so, I feltthat was my reaction then, 
that he is putting a standard of proof up there that goes beyond what 
we ought to be required to do. That it is up to the Senate to determine 
if we've met whatever standard of proof they think is appropriate. It's 
enough for us to have evidence that we think if believed could require 
to have him removed. The more I think about it, that wasn't my immediate 
reaction, but it is now. It's a lot of foolishness to talk about that; 
we weren't concerned with admissability or anything else and all of 
those terms of the trial. That doesn't help you much, does it? 
DFS - Yes, it does. Is it accurate, then, to draw from that statement of yours 
that in a certain sense the fact preceeded the theoriJ in your evolving 
requaired standard of proof? 
MCB - Yes, absolutely. I think somewhere along the line--and I can't tell 
you whe!1-I concluded that he ought to be removed. I don't know when 
I came to that conclusion. 
SL - You did say in the Woodl i ef interview that the Preside~t is required to 
ad...1-iere to a standard of co:r.duct partly described by statute 1 party by the 
Con3tit ution, and I "wrestle" whet her it's also described by the 
reasonable expectat ions of t he Affierican peopl e . 





BUTLE?. 1 p5 
DFS - July 18th, or.e week before •••• 
:':CB - All right, I came a little bit from that, but not far, did I? 
DFS - Did you ever consider the so-called Ford standard? That an impeachable 
of fense is what the House considers it to be at a given time? 
!-:CB - Oh yes, that's absolutely true. Simply because thre' s no court of appeals. 
You impeach for failure to rr.eet whatever standard we want to set, post-
humously if we want to. So it is whatever we thin.!{ but that doesn't 
~~an that a guilt plea has got to follow. It's our judgment and dis-
cretion and I'm satisfied c s to that. That's why I got further and fruther 
a'ii::J".f from the vie'tT t hat our criminal code would tell us when the President 
O•J.ght to be removed or not. 
D?S - There is one other question that I have about. an impeachable- offense. 
Dictyou recall reading any particular books or references or historical 
sources during this period? 
MCB - Only my wife. 
DFS - Any particular one that stands out during this time? 
MCB - No, I'm a fast reader and not ver;1 proud of it, so I cannot recall. 
One little volume that Bill Coaen was playing with ••• 
SL & DFS - Burger ••• Pickle ••• ? 
MCB No, try again. Okay. I went through the material that John Doar 
. put together. 
DFS - And the s1unmar</ by the Libra:rJ of Congress? 
· MCB - Yesr I went throught that one. And I did have Burger's book. Somebody 
sent it to all of us. But I thumbed through them all and felt that in 
each instance the scholars really had the feeling that they didn't know 
ari_y more about it than I did. All this historical evidence wasn't very 
helpful to me. That is all there was to it. The only enligthening 
thing was "high crimes and misdemeanors 11-to find out- that a misdemeanor 
was not what we think a misdemeanor is today and that is about the only 
real help that the research gave me. Because the rest of it T think and 
still think is just totally a matter of dudgment. 
DFS - Just very briefly then: some outside factors that influenced you? For 
example, ~~s. Butler? To what extent during June and July of last year 
were you in communication with her about impachment? 
MCB 
D?S 
She was not here much of the time; she was in Roah0ke. She eame up one 
day-for a fe·,,; days. But I ca1)ed her daily. Several times a day and 
discussed it with her pretty freely and so as well with Manly, ITT'/ oldest 
son. Manly was home for a while. And I dusct.:.ssed it with Jimiey 1 CT-J 
third son,· who was up here at that time. 
Sort of a hi storical mes senger •••• 
-
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r-'.CB - Yes, that's right. Y:y fam:::.ly was quite influential in giving rr.e a reaction, 
DFS - Mrs. Butler, in the 11:cCall' s article, referred to anonorr:::ius phone calls 
and threatening mail. Had that ar.y background effect on you? 
!•'.CB - Oh, no. None of that really carr:e up u..'1til after rcy staterr:ent. But I think 
we may have over-reacted, I don't know. 
DFS - And your mother was never conuLnced? 
~CB - ?-zy- mother called that night and she called afterwards and said, "Is 
ever;thing all right?" That's about all. I think sae is convinced now. 
DFS - One final thh1g about thsse other factors: Evans-Novak, for example, 
on the 18th of Jum listed you 2.s "an i;npe::tchab2.e leaner.'! Did that 






No, no. I did not feel that it did. It .didn't also precipitate much mail. 
I didn't get stones as I can recollect either. 
On question 6- what information or evidence did you consider most helpful 
and convincing during the hearings, as far as you were concerned? 
That'sa pretty hard question, because I'm constantly thinking, and I 
realize I'm in a position to contradict myself. 
I assure you that you' 11 have an O•:::casion to uncontradict yourself. 
Well, I'm sure the tapes are more reliable now and I still f eel like the 
accumulated effected of it was more than anything else. An impression 
that this goes back a long way with me as far as Nixon is concenned. I 
never felt like he had any feeling for people-from the word go. I don't 
think this is essential for being President although it would help. Because 
tm be President, you're more sensitive to that. But I never felt ver-J 
warmly toward Nixon; I don't think anybody does, either. What's the most 
damaging to me was this general feeling that how cold-blooded he was. 
Itjust kept becoming more-that is the accumulated effect of the Nixon 
credibility, and accumulation of facts, certainly the conversation with 
John Dean. I know that you have ·got that on tape. The first time--is 
th3.t March 10th? I don't kno'lf. That conversation was the one that 
shook me more than anything else; the witnesses that testified that were~ 
influential in my judgment, I guess, were Kalmbach, simply because he was -
such a pitiful character, so obviously been used, although he may be a 
great actor. O'Brien because he was such a milktoast, and he was 
obviously tr,Jing to get away from it all; he probably was as guilty as any 
of them but he was so concerned about his own welfare that it reade you 
realize the quality of poeple that were involved in this thing. Butter/ 
field did not persuade me, I thought that was a lot of foolishness, 
building a case around a lot of suppositions that I wasn't impressed 
with. Joh:i Doar bore down on him pretty hard. There .'s'not a place 
the President didn't know about it. I didn't think that we needed that 
even when we got through to him. I don't thin.°!< that were any witnesses 
that pushed rr.e over the top. The facts did it. I guess John Dean's 
conversatdion, particularly though. 
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SL - Do you rernen:ber yoUT re,:1.c:,icn when you first actually hea.rd ,j;/ the 
:foite House tapes in com~itt-=B? 
t~GB - I remember being impressed ',-1ith the fact that he was in charge. That 
is all. Is that wh::it I say on one of my tapes? 
DFS - Yes. 
MCB - That about did it in my mind. I read somewhere that somebody else 
said differently amd I couldn't believe it. That Nixon was not in 
charge-I can't remember who I heard say that. I struck me as totally 
ridiculous. 
SL - Do you thi~~ if there hadn't been any taFes at all, could they have 
m;.de a clear -3.r.d co:-rvinci:--ig case 3.g;linst ?izon? 
MCB - Oh yes, I think the case could have been r::ade, but I don't think that 
the witnesses could have bean found. I don't thin.~ it would ever have 
crumbled to the extent that it did. I guess that's a little bit out 
of prejudice for John Dean, who turned in before he knew the tapes 
existed. Ye~, I believe that the case could have bean made. I think 
that we could have gotten the facts. If you are asking me was it the 
evidence outside the tapes, if the tapes were not admissable in evidence, 
and therefore we had to rely on statements outside the tapes, could we 
have made a case against the President? I think that, yes, we could but 
it would have taken us some more digging but the facts were there. But 
getting the witnesses to come forward under those circumstances would 
have been extremely difficult. 
DFS - You in your tapes _have made all sorts 'of very incisive comments on Doar, 
Jenner, Garrison, and so on. We don't have to pursue that. But I 
would like to aks you this, under number 7: who within the committee 
positively influenced you? 
1 \ ) 
J) X .MCB 
l 
Well, you know I think I was actually uninfluenced by Hogan. Cohen was 
on one side of me and Hogan was _on the other. I think that the four 
people that made the Republican membership on the Coalition, probably 
are the people who had the most influence on my judgment. I would listen 
to Chuck Wiggins, to Ed Hutchinson, but I felt that they'd prejudged it. 
So I didn't get much help from them. Outside the committee, I didn't: 
nobody on my staff went into it at all. ~'.y wife I'm quite sure had as 
much influence to do with it as anyone. Holton, the Governor, he and I 
are quite close--I rerr:ember disucssing it ;.iith him on several occ2.sions. 
He didn't influence me; it was obvious to r.:e that he was abandoning the 
Fresidnet. 
DFS - The person who you referred to r::ost, if you recall, in your tapes, is 
Walter Flowers •••• 
IvICB -- I do? From my conversatio:1s with him? 
D?S - It was just that repeaaedly you say, "I' rr. impressed with Walter's 
train of thought--that he seems to be leaning-that he had a follo~iing 
--that type of thing. 
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~~CB - :~·ell, I felt like his problem and r:,y probl '.'! m were the s a1il9. You are 
not saying that I ','1'a3 infl,..:.enced by conversations with him, but by ob-








Eoth--but you made it a point that you di d not talk directly to him, 
and said that "I'd rather hear indirectly what he is saying." 
I really, for a long time, didn't disnuss with him. I didn't discuss 
it □uch witi1 Jim Mann; he didn't have too much to say. And Sam Garrison 
you know is from rrv home town. I really didn't think ~e was 
in the facts. 
At one point, you said t hat it's amazing he has a reputation of a 
prudent pro3ecutor; dowr:. ir. Roanoke he was "hanging Sam." 
Ee was one who made the argument that we should be prudent 
that was a little out of line for him because he was quite a hanging 
My recollection is so limited now, how could it posssibly be as good 
as the tapes? 
And we have the~fine. Would you go on to number 9? That of course 
comes right at the end of July. What is your recollection of the 
earliest, however informal, first person-to-person contact that led 
up to the Tuesday morning meeti~.g in Railsback's office? 
My recollection is walking over there with Jerr;- Waldie one day and 
he was laughing about it. I can't reeember exactly, but in substnace 
I don't like what John Doar has done and don't want to vote against an 
impeachment resolu.tion because it it a sloppy piece of work. That's 
basically rrr.r attitude. And he said we've got some other people working 
on it. And I said thah I would like to be in contact with them. 
Beginning the mechanics of the emerging so-called Caalition •••• Now 
already on July 18th, which is five days early, you noted, "We are 
meeting informally all the time -- RAils, Cohen, myself, and Fish." 
Now looking back, wasn't that kind of a presage? 
MCB I think so, yes. I don't know the dates. That weekend Cohen and Fish , 
stayed there and talked to that crazy Cates. They urged me to do that, X J, 
but I went home for the weekend. 
DFS - Did you frankly go home on purpose to •••• ? 
MCB 
DFS 
No. I went home because my family was there. 
-----What do you mean by "cra.iy" Cates? ~-----~------ ] J 
MCB - I j ust thir~l.: t hat he was not very objective in his analys is. But his 
presentatiion was prett y thorough and pretty good.. So we had to listen •••• 
DFS - Were you ever personnally briefed by him? 
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MCB - Yes, I went to breakfast with him over in the Capitol Hill Club. Ycu 
don't have a recollection of that? 
D?S - I'll lo·ok it :J.p. 
MCB . - Now let's go back to the day, the weekend that Fish and all those people 
met. When I had breakfast with eates-I had pretty extensive notes on 
that-I remember that David Den.-riis was there-and McClo:r.r, possibly. 
DFS - The Doar drafts came but on Friday the 19th. Then this breakfast 
evidently took place on Saturday the 20th? 
MCB - Yes, and I went home after that. 
DFS - Then the first Ccalition meeting was on the ~orning of Tuesday the 23rd~ 
'-
MCB - That's right, becatUie Monday I probably was driving up in the morning 
with Jimmy. So that was the first time we met and that was quite a 
good briefing. That was my first time I knew him [Cates]-the weekend 
before the Coalition. 
DFS - That's valuable. 
MCB - I'm not sure; I usually take notes because it makes me pay attention, 
not for the purpose of just historical recordss So I took pretty ex-
tensive notes on what he told us. 
DFS - Now once the Coalition as such started to form, I noticed you missed 
only one meeting, and that was the meeting on Friday morning in Mann's 
office. Therefore three people who most consistently attended were 
yourself, Railsbac°k, _and Mann. Was there any particular reason why you 
were not in the Mann office meeting? 
MCB - It was an early morning meeting. 
DFS - That's right. 
MCB - I was physically exhausted; I was tired. Jirrucy- was there with me and 
we just got back and took our time :getting there. 
DFS - Fine. Now as the week went on with the seven of you the!"e, did you have 
any thoughts that there should be Sarbanes or Hungate or Froelich or 
Hogan or McClory or- that there was an omission? 
Absolutely not. You have our discussion, I thin.~, that's why Froehlich 
wasn't invited in, and why McClory wasn't invited it. Cohen got so mad ' 
when -se sent the notes over to McClory. I don't thnk acy of those 
folks would have contributed an.ything. Even now, I don't think they · 




DFS - Could you just recall any specifics in illustrating the intensity of 
eit her the meetings or the week? 
t-'.CB - I don't recall any friction, any disagreement. I guess we all were kind 
of amused when Jim Mann came back with the draft that we thoght we were 
working on. But no, I think it was a verJ cohesive group. Everybody I 
think made a pretty good contribution. I think it goes back to the fact 
that Jim Hann and I are the same kind of lawyers I think. We both are 
very careful in our drafting. I don't know as he did a lot of trial workJ 
he didn't strike me as a trial lawyer. Not too spectacular type. But I 
expect he's done quite a bit of trial work. But I never didi I was more 
interested in draftiP.g. Anmd I think all of us had more of that kind of 
backgrour1d so we got along pretty 'JJell.. 
DFS 
MCB 
- This next question may be redundar.t, but I wcw.d like yc..rr comment on 
the ver-J fac:ous. a-dject-ive i•fragile!' coalition. Do you think it_ 1'las 
re1;1lly justified? 
I think the fragile coalition crept into meaning as a reference to the 
fragile connection between the all-powerful group of Democrats who find 
themselves at the mercy of seven swing votes. And I think the fragility 
was the relationship between the two groups, but somehow got translated. 
But I may be wrong, but that's my feeling about it. I never felt that 
we were fragile; if we had been fragile, we'd been shattered by the fate 
of the Kastenmeier resolution of when we were going to vote. That should 
have blown it but it didn't. 
-DFS - Would you comment on this-someone said that there was more partisanship 
in the matter of procedure than in substnace ••• ? · 
MCB - You mean within our group or the whole committee? 
DFS - Within the whole committee. 
MCB - Well, I think that they gave us. the procedural points so that they 
wouldn't have to on the substantive ones. I really don't know, well~ 
I guess that's true. I think we shamed them into being a -little bit 
more magnanimous. procedurally. I judge from what I read briefly is that 
Rodino made all these concessions to keep us three or four Republicans 
within the realm of possibility. I think he did. I think that was good 
strategy. I don't know but that I would have been tempted to leave. -
It's mighty easy to get up and storm out and say well, "My God, this 
is · being railroaded," and that makes you rather weak • . So I thirLl< we 
would have grabbed at that oportunity if it had been presented and we 
were conscious of it. Well, I don't know if it was partisan; I just 
think that that was one of the facts of life. 
[Informal _discussj_on 9f Hilton H_ead sessio_h]-'; 
DFS ~. - That brings up another question: what would be your reactio:-i to having 
a versJ informal, perhaps hour long interview with the seven wives; On 
the topic of their role during that week. I think that would be a valuable 
part. 
.,-..... 
BUTLER, p 11 
MCB - I lL.'7.derstar.d nm,; your batchelor existence. If you thin.l< that you can 
dispose of that in one hour •••• 
MUCH LA UGHTE..-q. 
DFS - ~ie thought that would have considerable discussion about the evolving 
drafts at Hilton Head. Mainly about the evolving drafts. You notice 
in Book #2, you have the drafts as we have them and Mr. Thornton has 
given us his two drafts and .Mr. Mann is going to provide us with his 
drafts. 
MCB - Then you've got the tcl,pe with Mooney. 
DrS - That's right. So now we have all the drafts that were invol,/ed. And 
the other members have m,3de comments which you already have_ about that. 
So when we get together, we thought one of the things that we are going 
to zero in ·on was the reason f'or the changes ·in the drafts as they came 
--especially in articles I and II. ,., 
t-!CB - You know I was a little disappointed in your · putting the changes into 
the drafts. Still it takes some real thinking to figure out just what 
changes were made. I don't know how to present that but what basically 
you want to ask is how each word was changed? Is that right, is that 
what you ultimately plan to do?. 
DFS - Well, that's up to you • 
MCB That's what I would like to do, you know. 
DFS - That's very good. But I think for us to have done any more than 
present you with the drafts would have opened up to the charge of 
reading into them. Why did this change or not- we simply provided 
the primary sources. 
MCB . - Oh, I agree with that. I'd like to see it set up in twelse columns 
so that we can see the transition from one paragragh to another 'till 
you get to the end. Do you follow· what I'm saying? 
DFS - I do, very much. And that we can do at Hilton Head. And each one of 
you will have a copy of that line-up. Then of course Tom Mooney is there 
also. That leads us to the last question here, namely, your hindsight 
on the Coalition, which to a large part is not covered by your various 
memos and tapes. I'll just start out this and Steve can pursue it. Now 
in anticipation of the Senate trial, at that time were you as a lawyer 
satisfied with Articles I and II as defensible? 
P.:CB - Yes I I was pretty well satisfied as to that. Y~s, I was. With Article ' 
III I was not. 
DFS - I know that. Now as to your immediate personal reaction. I know, for 
example, that you took a walk with Jimmy and you me_ntioned Mr. Thornton 
im:nediately afterwards. Then, for example, in the morning, the newboy 
left you_ a note, "Cook the Crook." And your conservative neighbors 
app:tauded you and so on. What was yourown feeling that Saturday night, 
the 27th, once the final vote on Article I had been completed? · 
BUTIB~, pl2 
~:CB - I don't know, I think I gave very little to Wo,:)dlief on that too, didn't I' 
• I gues3 I was just kind of apprehensive about whether we had done the 
right thing or not. 
DFS - Did you feel if any of the non-Coalition eembers, a Waldie or a Drinan, 
who from the very word~go ·had been obviously in favor of impeachment, 
were in any sense palying a role of tremendous regret at the moment of 
the .final vote? 
¥.CB - No, I wasn't conscious of that. I didn't have any reaction at all. My 
reaction to most of those guys was a great relief that they .didnt' blow it, 
\ : No, I guess I didn't have t hat reaction, although I would have to admit 
D) \ that I felt a little bit like l"'.ezvinsky over-dramatized it. I remember ( )his vote. The impression of reluctance was misleading. Several of them 
may have felt that impresssion, knowing the disappointment I think they 





good time being stars. ,,,. 
Do you think there were beneficial results for our . "sy·stem" of government 
that came out of the inquiry? To give you an idea . of what we're think-
-ing of-someone has said that up to that point the White House, not simply 
the President, had become a "fourth branch of government responsible 
largely to itself.! One, do you think that's a justiifiable statement 
and two, do you think that's stopped? 
Well, yes and no. Yes, I think we've brough~ the executive power back to 
reality. And that's good. I think we established taht the impeachmEmt 
process has to be taken seriosly. That we can do it if we have to. 
Yes, I think that we have established standards of conduct for the 
Presidency that will be hard to violate. And I think that's good. 
If the President had not released the June 23rd tapes, how go you think the 
three articles would have fared? 
MCB - I think that the third article woudl probably have been shot down in the 
House. I think that's almost indefensible; I just don't see how you can 
justify that •••• On the last. two, I think we would have been about two-
thirds to one-third. 
SL - ;f{jat about the Senate? 
MCB -- I just have no feeling for the Senate. It would have been a trial with 
very few· surprises in it. An awful long drawn out affair-and like I 
tried· to say before, it's a policy decision, not guilty or innocent: 
not guilty is• the way you express this View; that even if the facts are 
true, you don't think that the President ought to be removed. And· I 
suspect that the public sentiment is such that the Senate would have gone 0 1 
and removed him. I think we got it goiP.g on the theory that there was 
going to be a trial. And I think taht the evidnec·e could have been 
presented in such a way as to be convincing. If this thing had had a 
lawyer's proceeding by committee the whole impeachment trail would have 




DFS . - Eow do you no·,., evaluate the tre;::i.tiT.ent by the media? Not simply the 
impeachr:-1ent .procedu::e, _but of the Co.:llition particularly? · 
MCB - Well, I don't thin:-< the media has picked up the signif,icance of ,-ihat 
we had and did. I may be wrong, but I feel that it was pretty signifi-
cant.in the outcome and I certainly have not read anything that indi-
cates that they picked that up and what we do read is that we orchestrated 
and manipulated all of that. 
DFS - In the Jimmy Breslin book you wer.e almost wholly ignored, and the 
'I'heorlore White book gave curosry passing •••• 
~-:CB - I thi:11<: we were closer to the scene than that. I think we did a 
persuasive job. Because everybody had a mutual respect, it turned 
the whole crowd around. I mean we just would have looked at it harder · 
and so f'orth and so I th:.nk it wa.s significant-that's all there was _ 
to it. I just think- we had the destiny of the prceddings in our control. 
And you just can't ignore it. Well, that's it! 
DFS - You of all the seven have probably said the lead publicly, prior to the 
last week of July. Was that out of concern for your district or natural 
reluctance to discuss the case or your own uncertainty on how you were 
going to vote? 
MCB - Well, that' s my style. I re serve judgment; I simply don't talk about 
it so I can keep f!1Y opeions open. Also probably masking the fact that I 
was having trouble corralating all the evidence in my own mind, and so 
I didn't want to display my ignorance. . Third, I think it was ethical.. 
I think it was a misaake to discuss it; I don't think it was ethical, 
a mistake to discuss the substance of the evidence at all and a number 
of people did that. And the press understood that because that's what 
I wanted them to do. As far as my district was concerned, I thought I 
was in awful good shape and didn't work on it too much. It turned out 
I was probably wrong. 
DFS - As a matter of fact, then, how do you assess your role in the hearings 
when the election results were in in November? · 
MCB - I was reelected by virtue of the fact that I didn't have a real strong 
Democrat opponent. I did have a strong indiepened opponent. I was 
reelected by ~irtue_of .thess facts: a weak Democrat, the landslide against 
Nixon, and they had no place to go. The people who were Nixon's friends 
were mad at him. And me. They went I think with the thrid party candidate. 
And finally, Democrats £urned out to be of very sizable support for me. 
:a If President Nixon had still been in office and we had not had the im-
peachment vote, but no tapes, no resignation, therfore getting ready for 
a trial, and the Democrats had had a strong candidate, I would have been 
shot down the shoot. So I guess all things considered, it probably helped. 
DFS - We owe you a double than.1-<s, not only for these two hours and more but 
for the fact that you provided us with so much previous material. 
r.:CB - Okay, it's CT;/ pleasure, very much. Thank you. 
